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Abstract
This paper constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive dealing in the presence of multiple
entrants. Unlike a single-entrant model in the extant literature, an entrant competes not only with
the incumbent to deal with buyers but also with other entrants. The competition among entrants
then plays the role of commitment such that low wholesale prices are oered to buyers when
they deviate from exclusive contracts. We argue that this commitment eect becomes a barrier to
exclusive dealing and that the results dier drastically from the predictions of the single-entrant
framework.
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1 Introduction
Exclusive contracts have been a controversial issue among economists for some time. Seemingly, the
exclusive contract is anticompetitive because it may deter ecient entry and thereby reduce welfare.
However, the Chicago School opposes this view. They show that rational economic agents do not
engage in exclusive dealing for anticompetitive reasons because exclusive dealing does not increase the
joint surplus between contracting parties1. The Chicago School argument remains highly influential.
The key assumption of the Chicago School argument is that buyers are final consumers. Two re-
cent papers, Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) and Abito and Wright (2008), show that if buyers are
competing firms and they compete intensively, then an exclusive contract can deter ecient entry be-
cause exclusive dealing increases the joint surplus between contracting parties by extracting surplus
from final consumers. More surprisingly, Abito and Wright show that with nonlinear wholesale pric-
ing, exclusion is a unique equilibrium, regardless of the degree of downstream competition and any
cost advantage of the entrant.
The aim of this paper is to reexamine recent studies on exclusive dealing in the framework of
multiple entrants. Although Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) and Abito and Wright (2008) provide
the mechanism for anticompetitive exclusive dealing, they only analyze the case of a single entrant.
However, industries with high substitutability of production factors, products, or technologies may
be composed of multiple entrants. This paper shows that the existence of multiple entrants serves as
a barrier to anticompetitive exclusive dealing and that the results dier drastically from the single-
entrant model.
Although our argument is applicable elsewhere, the model presented in this paper follows Abito
and Wright (2008) in amalgamating most existing models of exclusive dealing. Hence, by comparing
our results with Abito and Wright (2008), we clarify the importance of multiple entrants. Abito and
Wright (2008) construct a model of exclusive dealing where downstream buyers compete imperfectly.
Their approach allows us to analyze the relation between the likelihood of exclusive dealing and the
degree of downstream competition under both linear pricing and nonlinear pricing.
1See Posner (1976) and Bork (1978). See Whinston (2006) for a survey.
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To understand the importance of multiple entrants, consider the case of linear wholesale pricing.
Under linear wholesale pricing, exclusive contracts can deter an ecient entrant when buyers compete
intensively. Abito and Wright (2008) show that in the case of a single entrant, this result holds, even
when the entrant has a large cost advantage. With intense downstream competition, buyers obtain
almost zero profits when all buyers sign exclusive contracts. Conversely, when one of the buyers
deviates from an exclusive contract, the deviant buyer obtains small profits because the ecient entrant
always oers it a wholesale price slightly lower than the marginal cost of the incumbent. This allows
the incumbent to deter ecient entry by oering an exclusive contract with low transfers, even when
the entrant is ecient.
The key implicit assumption is that the entrant is unable to commit initially to oer suciently
low wholesale prices when the buyer deviates from an exclusive contract. If the entrant were able
to do so, then the entrant could increase the buyer’s deviation profits and induce them not to sign an
exclusive contract. Therefore, the problem faced by the entrant is that it cannot make the commitment
to oer low wholesale prices, even when it is ecient.
This paper shows that the existence of rival entrants mitigates this commitment problem because
a multiplicity of entrants increases the upstream competition between entrants. This additional com-
petition reduces the wholesale prices oered to deviant buyers to the marginal cost of the second most
ecient entrant, and serves the role of commitment to oer low wholesale prices when buyers deviate
from exclusive contracts.
This finding suggests that while it is useful to express the fundamental mechanism of anticompeti-
tive exclusive dealing in the framework of a single entrant, we need to take into account the possibility
of multiple entrants when we apply the model to any real-world situation. Multiple entrants are likely
to exist in industries with many alternative factor inputs, products, and technologies. For example, in
industries with high technological progress, such as the information industry, a number of alternative
technologies may arise. If we explore the likelihood of anticompetitive exclusive dealing in these
industries, the single-entrant framework may lead to misleading predictions.
Although we mainly compare our results with Abito and Wright (2008), where anticompetitive ex-
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clusive dealing arises in the absence of scale economies, we can apply our model to the other exclusive
dealing models where anticompetitive exclusive dealing arises in the presence of scale economies2.
Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) show that in the presence
of scale economies, exclusive contracts can deter the ecient entrant. More recently, Fumagalli and
Motta (2006) and Wright (forthcoming) examine the model where buyers are competing firms. If we
consider the multiplicity of entrants in these models, the competition between entrants reduces the
wholesale price to the deviant buyer to a level where the second most ecient entrant cannot obtain
positive profits. This increases the deviation profits of buyers and becomes a barrier to anticompetitive
exclusive dealing. In addition to exclusive contracts, this paper is related to the literature concerned
with entry deterrence in the presence of multiple entrants (Ashiya (2000) and Ishibashi (2003)). In
those works, the existence of rivals decreases the possibility of entry. In contrast, this paper obtains
the opposite result: the existence of rivals increases the possibility of entry.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 in-
troduces the analysis under linear wholesale pricing. Section 4 analyzes the case where the incumbent
and entrants compete with two-part taris. Section 5 provides an example where the multiplicity of
entrants reduces the likelihood of exclusion with scale economies. Section 6 contains some concluding
remarks. The equilibrium outcomes in the subgame following the buyers’ decisions are in Appendix
A. Appendix B provides the proofs of all results.
2 Model
This section presents the model. The model we present follows Abito and Wright (2008). The new
dimension here is the multiplicity of entrants. This modeling strategy is designed to clarify the im-
portance of multiple entrants. We characterize an upstream and downstream market in Section 2.1.
The timing of the game is introduced in Section 2.2. Finally, we derive the conditions that exclusive
contracts need to satisfy in Section 2.3.
2Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) argue that exclusion without scale economies is more likely to arise than exclusion
with scale economies, showing that exclusion is not inecient if buyers can breach contracts and pay expectation damages.
However, exclusion without scale economies remains inecient, even if breach is possible. This is one reason why we
mainly explore exclusion without scale economies in this paper.
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2.1 Upstream and downstream markets
In the upstream market, three firms exist, an incumbent (denoted I), Entrant 1 (E1), and Entrant 2
(E2). These firms produce an identical product but dier in terms of their cost eciency. Both Entrant
i = 1 and 2 are more ecient than the incumbent: they have marginal cost cEi < cI . Without loss of
generality, we assume that cE1 < cE2 . Entrants need to incur a fixed cost to start production, F  0. We
assume that entrants can make wholesale price oers before they incur fixed costs3. To simplify the
analysis, we assume that F = 0. Note that exclusive dealing here arises in the absence of fixed entry
cost, and we examine the possibility where exclusive dealing arises in the absence of scale economics.
In Section 5, we provide an example where the multiplicity of entrants serves as a barrier to exclusive
dealing, even in the presence of scale economies (F > 0). The upstream firms deal with buyers who
are not final consumers but rather competing firms in the downstream market.
In the downstream market, there are two buyers associated with Buyer 1 (denoted B1) and with
Buyer 2 (B2). They are dierentiated and compete in prices. The cost of transformation or resale is
assumed to be zero for simplicity. Buyers sell to final consumers whose preferences are represented
by the following utility function:
U(q1; q2) = (q1 + q2)  
(q21 + q22 + 2q1q2)
2
; (1)
where 0   < 1 is a parameter indicating the degree of dierentiation between buyers and q j is the
amount of consumption of buyer j. Buyers become homogeneous as the value of  increases. When
 = 0, buyers are independent monopolists. However, when  = 1, buyers are homogeneous Bertrand
competitors. The inverse demand becomes p j =    (q j + q  j), where cI <   2cI and  > 0.
Buyer j’s demand depends not only on its price but also on buyer   j’s price:
q j =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
 p j
 if 0 < p j 
 (1 )+p  j
 ;
(1 ) p j+p  j
(1 2) if
 (1 )+p  j
 < p j < (1   ) + p  j;
0 if p j  (1   ) + p  j:
(2)
3This is an important assumption when we consider the likelihood of exclusive dealing in the presence of multiple
entrants. In the single-entrant model, this assumption is not important: the result is unchanged, regardless of the timing of
fixed costs. However, in the presence of multiple entrants, Entrant 2 does not join the upstream competition if entrants need
to incur fixed costs before making wholesale price oers. If the buyers are a number of final consumers, then assuming that
the entrants need to incur fixed costs before they make wholesale price oers may be realistic. In contrast, if the buyers are
firms, then assuming that entrants can make wholesale price oers before they incur fixed costs is more realistic.
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The interpretation of equation (2) is as follows. When the prices of buyers are suciently close,
both obtain positive demand. However, when the prices of buyers are suciently dierent, the higher-
priced buyer loses demand but the lower-priced buyer obtains all demand.
We measure entrant i’s cost advantage by Ei , which satisfies cI = Ei pm(cEi)+ (1  Ei)cEi , where
pm(cEi) is the monopoly price for the industry when marginal cost is cEi : pm(cEi) = (+cEi)=2. Ei = 0
implies that entrant i has no cost advantage. As Ei increases, entrant i becomes ecient. Following
Abito and Wright (2008), we assume 0 < Ei  14. From the definition of Ei , the marginal cost of
entrant i can be expressed as a function of Ei and cI as follows:
cEi = C(Ei ; cI) =
2cI   Ei
2   Ei
for i = 1; 2: (3)
The advantage in measuring entrant i’s cost advantage with Ei is that it simplifies the analysis. By
using Ei , we obtain results that do not depend on cI , , and . We can then analyze the possibility of
exclusive dealing with only three parameters E1 , E2 , and .
In our framework, the single-entrant case following Abito and Wright (2008) corresponds to the
situation where Entrant 2 has no cost advantage, E2 = 0. In the following analysis, we show that
the existence of Entrant 2 and its cost advantage becomes an important factor in determining the
possibility of exclusive dealing.
2.2 Timing of game
The timing of the game is as follows. The model contains three stages. In stage 1, the incumbent
makes simultaneous and nondiscriminatory exclusive oers to each buyer. This exclusive contract
involves some fixed compensation x  0. We assume that the incumbent is unable to oer wholesale
prices5. Buyers simultaneously decide whether to accept this oer. To avoid an open-set problem,
we assume buyers sign an exclusive contract if they are indierent between signing and not signing
4This assumption implies that the entrants’ monopoly price is higher than cI . Exclusion still exists, even when the
entrants are more ecient, but the analysis becomes more complicated.
5Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) point out that price commitment is unlikely if the nature of the product is not
precisely described in advance. In addition, even if the incumbent could set a price in Stage 1, the incumbent may not have
an incentive to do so because the optimal pricing is contingent on the buyers’ decision outcome in Stage 1, as we show in the
following analysis. The incumbent is then better o oering wholesale prices after observing the buyers’ decision outcome
in Stage 1.
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the contract. We do not allow all players to breach once the contract is signed. We refer to the buyer
signing the exclusive contract as the signer and the buyer not signing the contract as the free buyer.
The free buyer is able to buy not only from the incumbent but also from entrants in the latter stage.
Let S 2 f0; 1; 2g be the number of signers.
In Stage 2, upstream firms oer wholesale prices. There are three cases: S = 2, S = 1, and S = 0.
If S = 2, then only the incumbent oers wholesale prices to both buyers. If S = 0, then all upstream
firms oer wholesale prices to both buyers. If S = 1, then the incumbent oers wholesale prices to
each buyer, but entrants oer wholesale prices only to the free buyer. We assume that the incumbent is
able to discriminate between buyers that have signed exclusive contracts. To avoid open-set problems,
we assume that free buyers when indierent deal with ecient upstream firms. Furthermore, we
assume that for the case of S = 1, each buyer is unable to observe the wholesale oer to its rival6.
This assumption avoids the possibility of multiple equilibria in the subgame for S = 17.
In Stage 3, the upstream firm(s) start production and buyers compete in prices. Following Abito
and Wright (2008), we assume that buyers do not face a small fixed cost to stay active8. The incum-
bent’s profit in the case of S = k, where k 2 f0; 1; 2g, is denoted by IjS=k, and buyer j’s profit is
denoted by ljjS=k where l = s( f ) if buyer j is the signer (free buyer).
2.3 Requirement of exclusive contracts
Given equilibrium outcomes in the subgame following Stage 1 (provided in Appendix A), we derive
the conditions that an exclusive contract needs to satisfy. The exclusive contract needs to satisfy the
following three conditions. First, it has to satisfy the financial feasibility for the incumbent; that is, the
6For S = 0 and S = 2, both buyers deal with the same upstream firms. On the other hand, for S = 1, buyers deal with
dierent upstream firms: the free buyer deals with Entrant 1, but the signer deals with the incumbent in the equilibrium.
Because two groups exist for S = 1, the wholesale price oers that are not publicly observed are more realistic than those
that are publicly observed.
7See footnote (15) in Appendix A1.3.
8The epsilon participation cost for buyers serves the role of a barrier to an exclusive contract in Fumagalli and Motta
(2006). However, Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) argue that assuming that buyers are always active is more reasonable for
the following reasons. First, under some dierentiation, both the signer and the free buyer capture positive demand, and
therefore both cover the epsilon participation cost. Second, if we expand the incumbent’s contract space either by allowing
exclusive contracts that are contingent on all buyers signing them or by allowing up-front payments that are contingent on
being active, exclusive contracts again deter entry, even when buyers compete intensively. See the remark in Section III of
Simpson and Wickelgren (2007).
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incumbent cannot oer a x that is larger than half of its profits under exclusive dealing9; i.e.:
0  x  IjS=2
2
: (4)
Second, the exclusive contract has to satisfy individual rationality for buyers: put dierently, the
amount of compensation x induces each buyer to sign the exclusive contract as a best response when
its rival signs the exclusive contract; i.e.:
x + sjjS=2   fjjS=1 for all i = 1; 2: (5)
Finally, the exclusive contract is required to satisfy uniqueness; that is, the amount of compensa-
tion x induces each buyer to sign the exclusive contract as a best response when its rival does not sign;
i.e.:
x + sjjS=1   fjjS=0 for all i = 1; 2: (6)
In the following analysis, we explore the existence of a transfer x that simultaneously satisfies the
above conditions. In particular, we examine whether inequalities (4) and (5) are simultaneously satis-
fied because these conditions are necessary conditions for the existence of anticompetitive exclusive
dealing. Because inequalities (4) and (5) are simultaneously satisfied if and only if:
IjS=2
2
+ sjjS=2   fjjS=1 for all i = 1; 2; (7)
we mainly explore whether inequality (7) is satisfied in the following analysis. We then examine
whether inequality (6) also holds.
3 Linear Wholesale Pricing
This section analyzes the possibility of exclusive dealing under linear wholesale pricing. In order to
understand more easily the commitment eect of the competition between entrants, we first analyze
the case where downstream firms compete intensively ( ! 1) in Section 3.1. We then extend our
analysis to the case where downstream firms compete less intensively (0   < 1) in Section 3.2.
9When n buyers exist, the incumbent needs to oer x to all of the n buyers. Therefore, the financial feasibility condition
becomes 0  nx  IjS=2.
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3.1 Intense downstream competition
In this subsection, we examine the possibility of exclusive dealing when buyers compete intensively
( ! 1). We first explore the single-entrant case as the benchmark in Section 3.1.1. We then analyze
the multiple-entrant case in Section 3.1.2.
3.1.1 Benchmark: the single-entrant case
Assume that Entrant 2 does not exist. This corresponds to the case where Entrant 2 has no cost e-
ciency, E2 = 0. Abito and Wright (2008) show that when buyers compete intensively, the incumbent
can always exclude ecient entry and obtain almost monopoly profits:
Proposition 1 (Abito and Wright (2008) (Proposition 1)). Suppose that Entrant 2 does not exist. If
buyers compete intensively ( ! 1), then under linear wholesale pricing, there is a unique exclusion
equilibrium with the incumbent obtaining almost monopoly profits.
The intuitive logic for this result is as follows. When buyers compete intensively, buyers yield
almost zero profits for the same wholesale prices. Under exclusive dealing (S = 2), the incumbent
oers buyers the same wholesale price that is almost the monopoly level. Buyers then yield almost
zero profits, but the incumbent yields almost monopoly profits (See Figure 1).
When one of the buyers deviates from an exclusive contract (S = 1), the incumbent oers its
marginal cost to the free buyer, but Entrant 1 matches this oer. The free buyer then buys from
Entrant 1 at a slightly lower price than the marginal cost of the incumbent. Conversely, the signer buys
from the incumbent at a wholesale price close to the marginal cost of the incumbent. Because of small
cost dierence, the intense downstream competition induces the free buyer to yield small deviation
profits (See Figure 2). By using profits under exclusive dealing, the incumbent can easily compensate
for the buyers’ deviation profits with a small transfer x > 0. Each buyer is then better o signing an
exclusive contract. As a result, the incumbent excludes ecient entry and enjoys almost monopoly
profits.
More importantly, this result holds even when Entrant 1 is very ecient, E1 = 1. This follows
from the determination of the wholesale price to a free buyer for S = 1. For S = 1, Entrant 1 oers
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the free buyer a wholesale price slightly lower than the marginal cost of the incumbent, regardless of
its eciency. At the beginning of Stage 1, each buyer expects that it will be oered this wholesale
price when it deviates from the exclusive contract and that deviation is then not beneficial.
This result would not hold if Entrant 1 were able to transfer part of its profits to the free buyer for
S = 1. By so doing, dealing with Entrant 1 becomes beneficial to the free buyer for S = 1. When
Entrant 1 is ecient, it obtains high profits and could profitably transfer part of its profits to the free
buyer. If each buyer expected this transfer at the beginning of Stage 1, it would not sign an exclusive
contract. Therefore, Entrant 1 has an ex ante incentive to transfer part of its profits. However, Entrant
1 has an ex post incentive not to do so when the result in Stage 1 is S = 1. Because each buyer knows
Entrant 1’s ex post incentive, it expects a small deviation to profits and signs an exclusive contract.
The problem here is that Entrant 1 cannot commit to transfer part of its profits to the free buyer for
S = 1.
3.1.2 Multiple-entrant case
We now assume that Entrant 2 exists. In contrast to the single-entrant case, wholesale price competi-
tion now exists between entrants when free buyers exist. This additional competition makes it dicult
for the incumbent to deter ecient entry:
Proposition 2. Suppose that multiple entrants exist. If buyers compete intensively ( ! 1), then with
linear wholesale pricing, the incumbent can exclude ecient entry when Entrant 2 is less ecient
(E2  2=9). However, the incumbent cannot exclude ecient entry when both Entrant 1 and Entrant
2 are suciently ecient (E1 > E2 > 2=9).
This result lies in contrast with the result in the single-entrant case where exclusion is a unique
equilibrium outcome. The critical dierence arises when one of the buyers deviates from an exclusive
contract (S = 1). Because of the competition between entrants, Entrant 1 oers the free buyer a
wholesale price that does not match the marginal cost of the incumbent but rather that of Entrant 2.
The reduction of the wholesale price to the free buyer then increases the profits of the free buyer (See
Figure 3). Therefore, wholesale price competition between entrants serves as the role as a commitment
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to transfer part of the profits of Entrant 1. At the beginning of Stage 1, each buyer expects that it
will deliver large deviation profits as Entrant 2 becomes ecient. Each buyer then does not sign an
exclusive contract if Entrant 2 is suciently ecient.
Note that Proposition 2 also implies that the competition between entrants does not always serve as
a barrier to inecient exclusion; that is, the incumbent can profitably exclude ecient entry if Entrant
2 is inecient. The incumbent then has an advantage to hold the almost monopoly profits under
exclusive dealing. Therefore, if Entrant 2 is not ecient, the incumbent can profitably compensate
buyers and can exclude ecient entry.
The result here suggests that although the mechanism of anticompetitive exclusive dealing is in
the single-entrant framework, we need to take into account the existence of multiple entrants if we
wish to apply the model to real-world situations. In the single-entrant framework model, Abito and
Wright (2008) provide a very important implication that anticompetitive exclusive dealing is possible
with intense downstream competition. However, once we consider the multiplicity of entrants, the
possibility of exclusive dealing also depends on the eciency of the second most ecient entrant.
As multiple entrants are likely to exist in the industries in the presence of alternative factor inputs,
products, and technologies, when we apply the model to these industries, the analysis in the single-
entrant framework may provide misleading predictions.
3.2 Less intense downstream competition
In this subsection, we extend the analysis to all degrees of downstream competition (0   < 1).
The aim of this analysis is to examine the robustness of Proposition 2 under imperfect downstream
competition. Abito and Wright (2008) also analyze the relation between the likelihood of an exclusion
equilibrium and the degree of downstream competition. In a single-entrant framework, they show that
exclusive dealing arises with intense downstream competition. We show that while their prediction is
correct, it overestimates the likelihood of exclusive dealing as in Proposition 2 when we consider the
possibility of multiple entrants:
Proposition 3. Suppose that upstream firms are restricted to oer linear wholesale prices. The multi-
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plicity of entrants decreases the likelihood of a unique exclusion equilibrium for all degrees of down-
stream competition where exclusion equilibrium arises in the single-entrant case.
Appendix B summarizes the more precise statement of Proposition 3. Figure 4 depicts the results
of Proposition 3. In order to understand easily the importance of the existence of Entrant 2, we
construct Figure 5 where Entrant 2 has no cost eciency (E2 = 0). Note that this coincides with the
single-entrant model in Abito and Wright (2008).
By comparing these figures, it is easy to see that exclusion is a unique equilibrium outcome when
downstream competition is not too strong ( < 0:76). This result coincides with Abito and Wright
(2008). One of the main reasons is double marginalization. The double marginalization prevents joint
profit maximization among contracting parties under exclusive dealing (S = 2). In addition, weaker
competition exacerbates the double marginalization problem. Therefore, weaker competition makes
it dicult for the incumbent to compensate the buyers’ deviation profits and makes exclusive dealing
dicult, even in the absence of Entrant 210.
Conversely, as downstream competition becomes strong (  0:76), exclusion equilibrium arises.
Proposition 3 implies that with strong downstream competition, the multiplicity of entrants becomes
a barrier to exclusive dealing. By comparing Figures 4 and 5, it is easy to see that the market environ-
ment of a unique exclusion decreases because of the existence of Entrant 2.
One of the significant results here is that the possibility of a unique exclusion equilibrium is most
likely not when buyers compete intensively ( ! 1) but when buyers compete slightly less intensively
( = 0:94). This result follows from the determination of the free buyer’s profits for S = 1. As
buyers compete less intensively, both the free buyer and the signer obtain positive demands, and
duopoly competition arises for S = 1. In the duopoly equilibrium, both buyers yield low (high) profits
with intense (less intense) downstream competition. The incumbent needs to oer a large amount
of compensation to buyers as they compete less intensively. Therefore, exclusive dealing becomes
dicult with intense downstream competition when buyers compete less intensively.
On the other hand, as buyers compete intensively, the free buyer monopolizes the downstream
10In Section 4, we show that the adaptation of nonlinear wholesale pricing solves the double marginalization problem and
that there exists an exclusion equilibrium, even when downstream competition is suciently relaxed.
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market. In order to monopolize the downstream market, free buyers are required to choose a high (low)
price with intense (less intense) downstream competition11. This implies that under monopolization by
the free buyer, the free buyer’s profits increase as buyers compete intensively. From the incumbent’s
view, the amount of compensation increases with the intensity of downstream competition. Hence,
exclusion equilibrium is more likely to arise when downstream competition is slightly relaxed.
4 Two-part Taris
In this section, we extend the analysis to allow upstream firms to adapt two-part taris. Two-part taris
consist of a linear wholesale price and an upfront fixed fee, denoted by (w;  ) 2 R2+. In the single-
entrant model, Abito and Wright (2008) provide the strong result that the adaptation of nonlinear
wholesale pricing allows the incumbent always to exclude ecient entry. However, we show that this
strongly depends on the assumption of a single entrant.
In order to understand our logic, we first review the result in Abito and Wright (2008) and explain
why exclusion is a unique equilibrium outcome in the framework of a single entrant. We then show
that a multiplicity of entrants does not always lead to the exclusion equilibrium. The result in Abito
and Wright (2008) is summarized as follows.
Proposition 4 (Abito and Wright (2008) (Proposition 5)). Suppose that Entrant 2 does not exist. If
upstream firms can oer two-part taris (w;  ), then exclusion is a unique equilibrium outcome for all
degrees of downstream competition and cost eciencies of the entrant.
Figure 6 summarizes the above proposition. There are two main reasons why nonlinear whole-
sale pricing allows the incumbent always to exclude ecient entry in the single-entrant case. First,
nonlinear wholesale pricing solves the double marginalization problem and achieves joint profit maxi-
mization among contracting parties under exclusive dealing (S = 2). Therefore, compared with linear
wholesale pricing, nonlinear wholesale pricing increases the joint profits between the incumbent and
buyers for S = 2; see the left-hand side of inequality (7).
11See Appendix A.1.3 Case (C) and (D).
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Second, another eect exists in the single-entrant case such that nonlinear wholesale pricing re-
duces the free buyer’s profits when one of the buyers deviates from an exclusive contract (S = 1); see
the right-hand side of inequality (7). With linear wholesale pricing, the free buyer yields high profits
as Entrant 1 becomes ecient. However, with nonlinear wholesale pricing, Entrant 1 can withdraw
the free buyer’s profits with the fixed free  > 0. Entrant 1 then chooses a two-part tari that induces
the free buyer to yield exactly the same profits as if it dealt with the incumbent. Therefore, the free
buyer’s profits in the single entrant do not depend on the cost advantage of Entrant 1; rather, they are
the normal duopoly profits when both buyers compete by buying from the incumbent at the marginal
cost of the incumbent.
Note that the maximized joint profits of the incumbent and each buyer are always higher than
the normal duopoly profits of each buyer. Therefore, Abito and Wright (2008) conclude that the
incumbent can always exclude ecient entry in the case of a single entrant. However, as with linear
wholesale pricing, this result would not hold if Entrant 1 oered a suciently low fixed fee for S = 1.
By lowering the fixed fee, Entrant 1 could increase the deviation profits of each buyer and thereby
induce each buyer not to sign an exclusive contract. Therefore, the problem here is that Entrant 1
excessively withdraws the free buyer’s profits with a fixed fee and it cannot commit to oer a low
fixed fee for S = 1. This paper shows that as with linear wholesale pricing, the multiplicity of entrants
solves this commitment problem under nonlinear wholesale pricing:
Proposition 5. Suppose that upstream firms adapt two-part taris (w;  ). The multiplicity of entrants
decreases the likelihood of a unique exclusion equilibrium for all degrees of downstream competition.
Appendix B provides a precise statement of Proposition 5. Figure 7 depicts the results of Proposi-
tion 5. Proposition 5 implies that as with linear wholesale pricing, the existence of Entrant 2 serves the
role of a barrier to inecient exclusive dealing. Because of the wholesale price competition between
entrants, Entrant 1 chooses a fixed fee  so that the free buyer yields profits so as to deal not with the
incumbent but rather with Entrant 2 for S = 1. Therefore, the existence of Entrant 2 serves the role of
a commitment to reduce the fixed fee. This makes the free buyer’s profits for S = 1 depend on the cost
advantage of Entrant 2. If Entrant 2 is suciently ecient, then each buyer expects that it is better
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o deviating from an exclusive contract at the beginning of Stage 1 and so does not sign an exclusive
contract.
In addition, the comparison between linear wholesale pricing and nonlinear wholesale pricing
leads to two main findings. First, compared with linear wholesale pricing, the adaptation of nonlinear
wholesale pricing increases the possibility of exclusive dealing: NL() > L() for all 0   <
1. This follows from the achievement of the joint profit maximization for S = 2. The joint profit
maximization allows the incumbent to compensate buyers for a larger amount of profits than linear
wholesale pricing. This increases the possibility of exclusion equilibrium.
Second, compared with linear wholesale pricing, the multiplicity of entrants serves the more im-
portant role as a barrier to anticompetitive exclusive dealing under nonlinear wholesale pricing. Under
linear wholesale price, the incumbent cannot exclude ecient entry, regardless of the existence of
multiple entrants if downstream competition is not too strong ( < 0:76). In contrast, under nonlinear
wholesale pricing, the incumbent can always exclude ecient entry in the absence of the multiplicity
of entrants. Therefore, under nonlinear wholesale pricing, exploring the possibility of anticompeti-
tive exclusive dealing in the single-entrant case may lead to more misleading predictions than linear
wholesale pricing.
5 Scale Economies
Although we can examine exclusive dealing in the absence of scale economies in Simpson and Wick-
elgren (2007) and Abito and Wright (2008), our logic is applicable to exclusive dealing in the presence
of scale economies. In order to show the applicability, this section provides an example of how the
multiplicity of entrants reduces the likelihood of exclusive dealing with scale economies in Fumagalli
and Motta (2006). To simplify the analysis, we assume that  =  = 1 and cI = 1=2. In order to
coincide with Fumagalli and Motta (2006), we analyze the case where buyers are independent monop-
olists12  = 0. To simplify the analysis, Entrant 1 is ecient enough that E1 = 1 (cE1 = 0). We first
12When buyers are independent monopolists in Fumagalli and Motta (2006), buyers’ profits depend only on the wholesale
prices oered to themselves. This model structure coincides with Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991), where buyers are
final consumers whose surplus depends only on their own prices.
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explore the single-entrant case in Section 5.1. We then examine multiple entrants in Section 5.2. We
assume that upstream firms are restricted to linear wholesale prices.
5.1 Single-entrant case
Suppose now that Entrant 2 does not exist. In the absence of scale economies (F = 0), we have
sS=2 = 1=64, IjS=2 = 1=16 and EjS=2 = 0 for S = 2, 
f
S=0 = 1=16, IjS=0 = 0, and EjS=0 = 1=4
for S = 0, and  fS=1 = 1=16, 
s
S=1 = 1=64, IjS=1 = 1=32, and EjS=1 = 1=8 for S = 1.
Suppose now that the fixed cost is suciently high that Entrant 1 requires both buyers to be
profitable: 1=8 < F < 1=4. If the incumbent can only make simultaneous and nondiscriminatory
exclusive oers to each buyer, then there exist both an exclusion equilibrium and an entry equilibrium.
However, if buyers can coordinate, they prefer the entry equilibrium to the exclusion equilibrium
because upstream competition raises their profits. Therefore, the entry equilibrium is more likely.
The exclusion equilibrium becomes a unique equilibrium outcome if we extend the contract space.
For example, if the incumbent can make discriminatory oers where x1 =  fS=0   sS=2 +  to Buyer 1
but x2 =  to Buyer 2 for any small  > 0, then there is a unique exclusion equilibrium13. This result
follows from  fS=0 < 
s
S=2 + IjS=2.
Note that this result would not hold if Entrant 1 were able to oer low wholesale prices for S = 0.
By so doing, each buyer’s profits for S = 0 would increase. This might make it dicult for the
incumbent to exclude Entrant 1, even if it could use discriminatory oers. For example, if Entrant 1
oered w fE1 jS=0 < (4 
p
5)=4  0:441, then buyers would be better o not signing exclusive contracts
with discriminatory or sequential oers:  fS=0 > 
s
S=2 + IjS=2. In addition, if Entrant 1 oered
w
f
E1 jS=0 = 2=5 < (4  
p
5)=4, then Entrant 1 would yield E1 jS=0 = 6=25. In this case, Entrant 1
could profitably deal with each buyer for S = 0 if 1=8 < F < 6=25. Therefore, if entrants were able
to commit to make such wholesale prices for S = 0, the incumbent could not exclude Entrant 1 as a
unique equilibrium outcome, even with discriminatory oers.
13Abito and Wright (2008) show that this result holds for all degrees of downstream competition (0   < 1) in Proposi-
tion 3.
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5.2 Multiple-entrant case
Suppose now that Entrant 2 does exist. We assume that Entrant 2 is also ecient, E2 = 1    for
any small  > 0 and F = 1=6. The existence of Entrant 2 does not aect the equilibrium outcomes
for S = 2 and S = 1. However, the existence of Entrant 2 changes the equilibrium outcomes for
S = 0. For S = 0, Entrant 2 oers wholesale prices at the level where its profit is equal to fixed cost:
E2 jS=0 = 1=6 and Entrant 1 profitably matches this oer w
f
E1 jS=0 = (3  
p
3)=6  0:211. With this
wholesale price, each buyer yields  fS=1 = (2 +
p
3)=24 > 1=16. Because  fS=0   (sS=2 + IjS=2) =
(1 + 8p3)=192 > 0, the incumbent cannot profitably compensate one of the buyers, even when it uses
discriminatory oers.
Note that the only dierence is the existence of Entrant 2. This adds competition between entrants
in the upstream competition for S = 0 and reduces wholesale prices to buyers, and increases buyers’
profits for S = 0. The incumbent cannot compensate for these profits, even with discriminatory
oers, if Entrant 2 is suciently ecient. Therefore, exploring the likelihood of exclusion with scale
economies in the framework of a single entrant may also lead to misleading prediction.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has explored recent studies on exclusive dealing in the framework of multiple entrants.
Unlike a single-entrant model, an entrant needs to compete not only with the incumbent but also with
its rivals. We find that the competition between entrants serves as a barrier to exclusive dealing, and
the results dier drastically from the single-entrant model.
This paper provides new implications for antitrust agencies: put simply, we need to take into
account the existence of multiple entrants when we apply the model to real-world situations. The
findings here imply that earlier results obtained in the single-entrant framework may depend on the
assumption of a single entrant. However, multiple entrants may exist in industries in the presence of
alternative factor inputs, products, or technologies. Although the fundamental mechanism of exclusive
dealing is in the single-entrant framework, it may overestimate the possibility of exclusion and may
lead to misleading predictions.
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Our result is dierently interpreted in that anticompetitive exclusive dealing is more likely to be
observed in the industries with few alternative factor inputs, products, and technologies14. In such
industries, there is less opportunity for multiple entrants to appear, and exploring the possibility of
exclusion in a single-entrant framework may be more suitable. Therefore, the possibility of anticom-
petitive exclusive dealing increases.
Several outstanding issues require future work. First, there is concern about the generality of our
results. While the analysis is in terms of a parametric example, the results may extend to settings
that are more general. Second, there is a concern about the incumbent’s behavior needed to achieve
a market environment where exclusive dealing is possible. Previous studies have mainly explored the
existence of exclusive dealing for anticompetitive reasons. However, the incumbent may be able to
aect the market environment to exclude the more ecient entry. We trust this study will assist future
researchers in addressing these important issues.
A Equilibria in the subgame following Stage 1
This Appendix provides the characterization of equilibria in the subgame following Stage 1. We
consider each of the possible subgames for S = 2, S = 0, and S = 1, respectively. We first explore
the case of linear wholesale pricing in Section A.1. We then examine the case of nonlinear wholesale
pricing in Section A.2.
A.1 Linear wholesale pricing
A.1.1 S = 2
When both buyers sign exclusive contracts in Stage 1, they both deal with the incumbent. The incum-
bent sets wholesale prices for each buyer that maximize its profit by taking into account the buyers’
pricing in Stage 4 given its wholesale price: i.e.:
wsjjS=2 = arg maxw jcI
X
j2f1;2g
(w j   cI)q j(p1(w1;w2); p2(w1;w2)); (8)
14For example, MDS Nordion, which produces Molybdenum-99, a radioisotope, has a 10-year exclusive contract with two
Japanese companies, Nihon Medi-Physics and Daiichi Radioisotope Laboratory. These companies produce Technetium-99m
from Molybdenum-99. The key point is that Molybdenum-99 is the only factor input available to produce Technetium-99m.
This may make exclusive dealing easier.
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subject to:
p j(w j;w  j) = arg maxp jw j(p j   w j)q j(p j; p  j); (9)
given w  j for j = 1; 2. In the equilibrium, the incumbent yields:
IjS=2 =
(   cI)2
2(1 + )(2   ) ; (10)
and each buyer j = 1; 2 yields:
sjjS=2 =
(   cI)2(1   )
4(1 + )(2   )2 : (11)
A.1.2 S = 0
When neither buyer signs an exclusive contract in Stage 1, each becomes a free buyer and deals with
Entrant 1. Because of the competition between entrants, the equilibrium wholesale price decreases to
the marginal cost of Entrant 2: w fjjS=0 = cE2 for all j = 1; 2. Given this wholesale price, each buyer
chooses the price to maximize its profits: i.e.:
p fjjS=0 = arg maxp jcE2
(p j   cE2)q j(p j; p  j); (12)
for all j = 1; 2. In the equilibrium, the incumbent obtains zero profits: IjS=0 = 0. On the other hand,
each buyer j = 1; 2 yields:

f
jjS=0 =
(   cE2)2(1   )
(1 + )(2   )2  4
j
S=2: (13)
A.1.3 S = 1
When one of buyers signs the exclusive contract but the other does not, only the signer deals with the
incumbent. Without loss of generality, assume that buyer   j signs the exclusive contract. Then, buyer
j becomes the free buyer and deals with Entrant 1 in equilibrium. Entrant 2 oers its marginal cost to
the free buyer. On the other hand, the incumbent and Entrant 1 choose the profit maximization price
by taking into account the buyers’ pricing in the final stage given their wholesale prices: i.e.
(*)
w
f
jjS=1 = arg maxw jcE1
(w j   cE1)q j(p j(w j; p  j); p  j); (14)
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and:
ws  jjS=1 = arg maxw  jcI
(w  j   cI)q j(p j; p  j(p j;w  j)); (15)
subject to:
w j  cE2 ; (16)
p j(w j; p  j) = arg maxp jw j(p j   w j)q j(p j; p  j); (17)
p  j(p j;w  j) = arg maxp  jw  j(p  j   w  j)q  j(p j; p  j): (18)
Let L(E1), M(E1), and H(E1) be defined such that:
1. for   L(E1), Entrant 1 sets its wholesale price to the free buyer at cE2 regardless of the
eciency of Entrant 2;
2. for  > M(E1), the incumbent sets its wholesale price to the signer at cI if entrants are almost
identical: E1   E2   for any  > 0; and
3. for   H(E1), the incumbent sets its wholesale price to the signer at cI regardless of the
eciency of Entrant 2.
In order to derive L and H , we assume that no constraints are active in the problem (*). Then,
we obtain the pair (w fjjS=1;ws  jjS=1):
w
f
jjS=1 =
8( + cI)   32(2 + cI)   2(   cE1)
16   92 ; (19)
and:
ws  jjS=1 =
8( + cE1)   32(2 + cE1)   2(   cI)
16   92 : (20)
Because cE2 < cI , we have w
f
jjS=1  cE2 if w fjjS=1  cI . Therefore, the critical value L is derived by
solving w fjjS=1 = cI with respect to , which implies:
L =
E1 +
p
196   340E1 + 145(E1)2   2
3(4   E1)
: (21)
For 0    L, Entrant 1 sets its wholesale price to the free buyer at cE2 even when Entrant 2 has low
eciency.
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The critical value H is derived by solving ws  jjS=1 = cI with respect to , which implies:
H =
p
49   48E1 + 12(E1)2   1
3(2   3E1)
: (22)
For H   < 1, the incumbent sets its wholesale price to the signer at cI regardless of the eciency
of Entrant 2. The free buyer then monopolizes the downstream market in equilibrium.
In order to derive M , we assume that the entrants are almost identical so that w fjjS=1 = cE2 in
problem (*). Then, we obtain:
ws  jjS=1(w fjjS=1 = cE2) =
4( + cI)   2(2 + cI)   2(   cE2)
8   32 : (23)
The critical value M is derived by solving ws  jjS=1 = cI with respect to , which implies:
M =
p
9   8E1 + 2(E1)2   1
2   E1
: (24)
For   M , the incumbent sets its wholesale price to the signer at ws  jjS=1 > cI even if the entrants are
almost identical. On the other hand, for  > M, the incumbent sets its wholesale price to the signer
at ws  jjS=1 = cI if Entrant 2 is suciently ecient:  > M(E2).
Note that L < M < H and all critical values are strictly decreasing in E1 2 [0; 1]. We define
four cases as follows: (A) 0    L, (B) L <   M, (C) M <  < H , and (D) H   < 1. We
explore each case as follows.
Case (A)
In case (A), w f (A)jjS=1 = cE2 but the other constraints are not active in problem (*). In the equilibrium,
the incumbent yields:

(A)
IjS=1 =
2((   cI)(2   2)   (   cE2))2
(1   2)(8   32)2 ; (25)
and the signer yields s(A)  jjS=1 = 
(A)
IjS=1=2. On the other hand, Entrant 1 yields:

(A)
E1 jS=1 =
(cE2   cE1)((   cE2)(4   32)   (   cI))
(1   2)(8   32) ; (26)
and the free buyer yields:

f (A)
jjS=1 =
((   cE2)(4   32)   (   cI))2
(1   2)(8   32)2 : (27)
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Case (B)
In case (B), ws(B)  jjS=1 > cI but w
f (B)
jjS=1 is not always restricted by the marginal cost of Entrant 2. w
f (B)
jjS=1 is
not restricted by the marginal cost of Entrant 2 if the entrant is not ecient. More precisely, w f (B)jjS=1 <
cE2 if and only if E2 < iw where:
iw(; E1) =
E1(16   (2 + 9))   4(1   )(4 + 3)
(2   )(4 + 3)   E1
: (28)
In the equilibrium, the incumbent yields:

(B)
IjS=1 =
8>>><>>>:
2((4 32)( cI ) ( cE1 ))2
(1 2)(16 92)2 if 0  E2 < iw

(A)
IjS=1 if 
iw  E2 < E1 ;
(29)
and the signer yields s(B)  jjS=1 = 
(B)
IjS=1=2. On the other hand, Entrant 1 yields:

(B)
E1 jS=1 =
8>>><>>>:
2((4 32)( cE1 ) ( cI ))2
(1 2)(16 92)2 if 0  E2 < iw

(A)
E1 jS=1 if 
iw  E2 < E1 ;
(30)
and the free buyer yields:

f (B)
jjS=1 =
8>><>>:(B)E1 jS=1(0  E2 < iw)=2 if 0  E2 < iw f (A)jjS=1 if iw  E2 < E1 : (31)
Case (C)
In case (C), the incumbent and signer do not always obtain positive demands. The incumbent and the
signer yield positive demands if Entrant 2 is not ecient. More precisely, ws(C)  jjS=1 > cI if 0  E2 <
 1M () where:
 1M () =
2(2 + )(1   )
2   2 ; (32)
and where  1M () is an inverse function of M(). In contrast, if Entrant 2 is suciently ecient,
 1M ()  E2 < E1 , then the incumbent and the signer yield zero demands ws(C)  jjS=1 = cI15. Note that
15Fumagalli and Motta (2006) point out in their Section 3 that multiple equilibria exist when the free buyer monopolizes
the downstream market S = 1. When the free buyer monopolizes the downstream market, the signer does not capture any
demand and profits in the subgame for S = 1. From the viewpoint of the incumbent, regardless of the price the incumbent
sets for the signer, the signer obtains no demand and the incumbent yields zero profits. Therefore, there exists a multiplicity
of equilibria in the subgame for S = 1. Fumagalli and Motta (2006) then show that both entry and exclusion equilibriums
exist. However, this depends on the assumption that the wholesale price to the signer is publicly observable and that the
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 1M > 
iw if and only if  < H . Therefore, in case (C), we have  1M > iw. When the free buyer
monopolizes the downstream market, it sets its price at p f (C)  jjS=1 = (cI  (1  ))=, which is sucient
for monopolization. Entrant 1 sets its wholesale price to the free buyer at w f (C)jjS=1 < cE2 if and only if
E2 < 
iw as in case (B). In the equilibrium, the incumbent yields:

(C)
IjS=1 =
8>>>>><>>>>>:

(B)
IjS=1(0  E2 < iw) if 0  E2 < iw

(A)
IjS=1 if 
iw  E2 <  1M
0 if  1M  E2 < E1 ;
(33)
and the signer yields s(C)  jjS=1 = 
(C)
IjS=1=2. On the other hand, Entrant 1 yields:

(C)
E1 jS=1 =
8>>>>><>>>>>:

(B)
E1 jS=1(0  E2 < iw) if 0  E2 < iw

(A)
E1 jS=1 if 
iw  E2 <  1M
(cE2 cE1 )( cI )
 if 
 1
M  E2 < E1 ;
(34)
and the free buyer yields:

f (C)
jjS=1 =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:

(B)
E1 jS=1(0  E2 < iw)=2 if 0  E2 < iw

f (A)
jjS=1 if 
iw  E2 <  1M
( cI )2(( cE2 ) ( cI ))
2
if  1M  E2 < E1 :
(35)
Case (D)
In case (D), the incumbent and the signer never obtain positive demand. They set ws(D)  jjS=1 = p
s(D)
  jjS=1 =
cI . In order to induce the free buyer to monopolize the downstream market, Entrant 1 needs to set its
wholesale price at w f (D)jjS=1 = minfcE2 ; ((2 2)cI (1 )(2+))=g. w f (D)jjS=1 is restricted by the marginal
cost of Entrant 2 if and only if E2   1M . The free buyer sets its price at p f (D)jjS=1 = (cI   (1   ))=.
In the equilibrium, both the incumbent and the buyers yield zero profits. However, Entrant 1 yields:

(D)
E1 jS=1 =
8>>><>>>:
( cI )(( cE1 ) (2 2)( cI ))
2
if 0  E2 <  1M

(C)
E1 jS=1( 1M  E2 < E1) if  1M  E2 < E1 ;
(36)
and the free buyer yields:

f (D)
jjS=1 =
8>>><>>>:
( cI )2(1 2)
2
if 0  E2 <  1M

f (C)
jjS=1( 1M  E2 < E1) if  1M  E2 < E1 :
(37)
incumbent can commit not to change the wholesale price to the signer. Note that when the incumbent oers a high wholesale
price to the signer, the free buyer chooses a price slightly lower than the wholesale price or its monopoly price. Therefore,
the incumbent can yield positive profits by charging a wholesale price lower than the free buyer’s price. Our assumption of
unobservable wholesale prices implies that the incumbent cannot solve this commitment problem. Under the unobservable
wholesale price case, the unique equilibrium outcome in the subgame for S = 1 is that the incumbent oers cI to the signer.
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A.2 Two-part taris
A.2.1 S=2
When both buyers sign exclusive contracts in Stage 1, each deals with the incumbent. The incumbent
maximizes its profit by setting its wholesale price so that each of buyers chooses the joint profit
maximizing price psS=2 = ( + cI)=2. This wholesale price is wsS=2 = cI + (   cI)=2. The incumbent
extracts all of the buyers’ profits by using a fixed fee and yields all profits:
IjS=2 =
(   cI)2
2(1 + ) : (38)
On the other hand, each of the buyers yields zero profits: sjjS=2 = 0 for j = 1; 2.
A.2.2 S=0
When neither buyer signs an exclusive contract in Stage 2, all upstream firms compete to deal with
each buyer. Because Entrant 1 is the most ecient firm, it attracts both buyers in the equilibrium. The
incumbent oers its best terms (cI ; 0) to both buyers. Entrant 2 oers its best terms (cE2 ; 0) to both
buyers. Entrant 1 only has to match Entrant 2’s oer to attract both buyers. In the equilibrium, both
buyers yield the duopoly profit:

f
jjS=0 =
(   cE2)2(1   )
(1 + )(2   )2  4
j
S=2(): (39)
for j = 1; 2. On the other hand, the incumbent yields zero profits: IjS=0 = 0. These equilibrium
outcomes are identical to linear wholesale pricing.
A.2.3 S=1
When one of the buyers signs the exclusive contract but the other does not, only the signer deals with
the incumbent. Without loss of generality, assume that buyer   j signs the exclusive contract. Then,
buyer j becomes the free buyer. In the equilibrium, the free buyer j deals with Entrant 1. Entrant 2
then oers its best terms (cE2 ; 0) to the free buyer, and Entrant 1 matches this to attract the free buyer
j. Therefore, the free buyer j’s profit is determined by the profit o the equilibrium path where it
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accepts oers from Entrant 2. The incumbent oers the wholesale price ws  jjS=1 = cI and extracts all
of signer   j’s profits. Downstream firms compete in prices given w fjjS=1 = cE2 and ws  jjS=1 = cI:
max
p jcE2
(p j   cE2)q j(p j; p  j); (40)
max
p  jcI
(p  j   cI)q  j(p j; p  j): (41)
Note that ps  jjS=1 > cI if and only if  < M . We define two cases as follows: (a) 0   < M and (b)
M   < 1. We explore each case as follows.
Case (a)
For  < M, the incumbent yields:

(a)
IjS=1 =
((2   2)(   cI)   (   cE2))2
(1   2)(4   2)2 : (42)
In contrast, free buyer j yields:

f (a)
jjS=1 =
((2   2)(   cE2)   (   cI))2
(1   2)(4   2)2 : (43)
Case (b)
For   M , free buyer j monopolizes the downstream market and chooses the monopoly price. In
the monopoly equilibrium, the incumbent and signer   j yield zero profits: (b)IjS=1 = s(b)  jjS=1 = 0. In
contrast, the free buyer yields:

f (b)
jjS=1 =
(   cI)2((   cE2)   (   cE2))
2
: (44)
B Proofs of all results
Proof of Proposition 2
See Proof of Proposition 3.
Q.E.D.
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Precise statement of Proposition 3
Suppose that upstream firms are restricted to oer linear wholesale prices. The possibility of exclusive
dealing is determined by the degree of downstream competition and the cost eciency of entrants
(; E1 ; E2) as follows.
1. If downstream competition is not too strong ( < 0:76), then the incumbent cannot exclude
ecient entry regardless of the cost eciency of entrants.
2. For suciently strong downstream competition ( > 0:94):
(a) the incumbent cannot exclude ecient entry if both Entrant 1 and Entrant 2 are suciently
ecient (E1 > E2 > L()); or
(b) the incumbent can exclude ecient entry if Entrant 2 is less ecient (E2  L()).
3. For an intermediate level of downstream competition:
(a) the incumbent cannot exclude ecient entry if either Entrant 1 is suciently ecient
(E1 > s() and E1 > 0:65 is sucient) or if Entrant 2 is suciently ecient (E2 >
L() and E2 > 0:32 is sucient); or
(b) the incumbent can exclude ecient entry either if Entrant 1 is not ecient (E1  L()) or
if Entrant 1 is not too ecient and Entrant 2 is not ecient (s()  E1 > L()  E2),
where
s() = 2(4 + 3)((4   3)
p(1   )(3   2) + 2(1   )(2   ))
(16   92)p(1   )(3   2)   2(2   ) ; (45)
L() =
8>>><>>>:
2((1 )(192+(64+160 642 393+184)) 2(2 )(8 32)(4 32))
p
(1 )(3 2))
192 (320+32 2562+733+454 185) for 0   < 0:94;
2(16(1 ) 2(42 14+9))
(4 )(4+ 22) for 0:94   < 1:
(46)
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Proof of Proposition 3
We first explore the existence of an exclusion equilibrium when the wholesale price to the free buyer
is not restricted by the marginal cost of Entrant 2 (E2 < iw). For  < 0:94, inequality (7) holds for
all E1 2 [0; 1]. For  < 0:76, inequality (7) never holds. For an intermediate level of downstream
competition, inequality (7) holds if and only if E1  s().
Second, we explore the existence of exclusion equilibrium when the wholesale price to the free
buyer is restricted by the marginal cost of Entrant 2 (E2  iw). For  < 0:76, inequality (7) never
holds. For   0:76, inequality (7) holds if and only if E2  L(). When exclusion is possible, the
incumbent oers x   fS=1   sS=2.
Finally, we prove that the incumbent excludes Entrant 1 and Entrant 2 as a unique equilibrium
outcome by oering x =  fS=1   sS=2. To do this, we show that for all for all (E1 ; E2 ; ) 2 [0; 1] 
[0; E1]  [0; 1],  fS=1 + sS=1   fS=0 + sS=2. Let H =  fS=1 + sS=1   ( fS=0 + sS=2). Note that:

f
S=0(; E2) + sS=2() =
(   cI)2(1   )(20   4E2 + (E2)2)
4(1 + )(2   )2(2   E2)2
; for all (E2 ; ) 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1]: (47)
On the other hand,  fS=1 + 
s
S=1 depends on . There are four cases, as shown in Appendix A.1.3.
Case (A)
When 0    L,  f (A)S=1 + s(A)S=1 depends on  and E2 . By dierentiating H(A)(E2 ; ) with respect to
E2 , we have @H(A)(E2 ; )=@E2  0 for all (E2 ; ) 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1]. Because:
H(A)(0; ) = (   cI)
2(1   )(128 + (32   48   52))
(1 + )(2   )2(8   32)2  0 for all 0    1; (48)
we always have H(A)(E2 ; )  0 in case (A).
Case (B)
For L <   M , there are two possibilities: E2  iw and E2 < iw. Because inequality (48) holds
for all 0    1, we have H(B)(E2 ; ) > 0 for E2  iw. On the other hand, for E2 < iw,  f (B)S=1+s(B)S=1
depends on  and E1 . Therefore, H(B) is a function of , E1 , and E2 . Because 
f
S=0(E2 ; ) is strictly
increasing in E2 , we examine the case E2 = iw(E1 ; ) where obtaining H(B)(E1 ; E2 ; )  0 is
26
most dicult in E2  iw. By dierentiating H(B)(E1 ;iw(E1 ; ); ) with respect to E1 , we have
@H(B)(E1 ;iw(E1 ; ); )=@E1  0 for all (E2 ; ) 2 [0; 1]  [0; H]. Because:
H(B)( 1L ;iw( 1L (); ); ) =
(   cI)2(1   )(128 + (32   48 + 52))
4(1 + )(2   )2(8   32)2  0 for all 0    1;
(49)
we have H(B)(E1 ; E2 ; )  0 for E2 < iw. Therefore, we always have H(B)(E1 ; E2 ; )  0 in case
(B).
Case (C)
For M <   H , there are three possibilities: 0  E2 < iw, iw  E2 <  1M , and  1M  E2 .
Because inequalities (48) and (49) hold for all 0    1, we have H(C)(E1 ; E2 ; ) > 0 for 0 
E2 < 
 1
M . On the other hand, for 
 1
M  E2 , s(C)S=1 = 0 and  f (C)S=1 depends on E2 and . Hence, H(C)
is a function of , E1 , and E2 . Because 
f (C)
S=0 (E2 ; ) is strictly increasing in  1M  E2 < E1 , we
examine the case E2 = E1 where obtaining H(C)(E1 ; E2 ; )  0 is most dicult in  1M  E2  E1 .
By dierentiating H(C)(E1 ; E1 ; ) with respect to E1 , we have @H(C)(E1 ; E1 ; )=@E1  0 for all
(E1 ; ) 2 [ 1M ; 1]  [M; 1]. Because:
H(C)( 1M (); 1M (); ) =
(   cI)2(1   )(16 + (3   8))
4(1 + )(2   )2  0 for all M    1; (50)
we have H(C)(E1 ; E2 ; )  0 for  1M  E2  E1 . Therefore, we always have H(C)(E1 ; E2 ; )  0 in
case (C).
Case (D)
For H   < 1, there are two possibilities: E2   1M and E2 <  1M . Because inequality (50) holds
for H    1, we have H(D)(E1 ; E2 ; )  0 for E2   1M . On the other hand, for E2 <  1M ,
s(D)S=1 = 0 and 
f (D)
S=1 depends only on . Hence, H
(D) is a function of E2 and . Because 
f (D)
S=0 () is
strictly increasing in E2 <  1M , we examine the case E2 = 
 1
M where obtaining H
(D)( 1M ; )  0 is
most dicult in E2   1M . Because H(D)( 1M ; ) = H(C)( 1M ; 1M ; ), inequality (50) implies that
we have H(D)(E1 ; E2 ; )  0 for E2 <  1M . Therefore, we always have H(D)(E1 ; E2 ; )  0 in case
(D).
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From cases (A), (B), (C), and (D), for all (E1 ; E2 ; ) 2 [0; 1]  [0; E1]  [0; 1], we have  fS=1 +
sS=1   fS=0 + sS=2. Therefore, the incumbent excludes Entrant 1 and 2 as a unique equilibrium
outcome by oering x =  fS=1   sS=2.
Q.E.D.
Precise statement of Proposition 5
Suppose that upstream firms adapt two-part taris (w;  ). The incumbent can exclude ecient entry
either if Entrant 1 is not ecient (E1  NL()) or if Entrant 2 is not ecient (E2  NL() < E1).
The incumbent cannot exclude ecient entry if Entrant 2 is suciently ecient (E2 > NL() and
E2 > 0:32 is sucient), where:
NL() =
8>>><>>>:
(1 )(3+2(4 2) 2(3+2(1+)(2 ))
16(1 ) 2(2 )2(3+) for 0   < 0:94;
2(4 32)
(2+)2 for 0:94   < 1:
(51)
Proof of Proposition 5
We first explore the existence of exclusion equilibrium. Inequality (7) hold if and only if E2  NL().
Because E1 > E2 , exclusion exists if E1  NL(). On the other hand, when E1 > NL(), exclusion
exists if E2  NL(). When exclusion is possible, the incumbent oers x   fS=1.
Next, we prove that the incumbent can exclude Entrants 1 and 2 as a unique equilibrium outcome
by oering x =  fS=1. We show that for all (E2 ; ) 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1],  fS=1   fS=0. We examine case (a)
and case (b) respectively.
Case (a)
For S = 0, the free buyer yields duopoly profits where its and its rival’s wholesale price is the marginal
cost of Entrant 2. However, for S = 1, the free buyer yields duopoly profits where its wholesale price
is the marginal cost of Entrant 2 but its rival’s wholesale price is the marginal cost of the incumbent.
Because the buyer’s profit is strictly increasing in its rival’s wholesale price, the free buyer yields
higher profits for S = 1. Hence,  f (a)S=1   fS=0 for all (E2 ; ) 2 [0; 1]  [0; M].
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Case (b)
Note that  f (b)S=1()   f (b)S=1(M) and  fS=0()   fS=0(M) for all   M . Because  f (b)S=1(M) =

f (a)
S=1(M)   fS=0(M), we have  f (b)S=1   fS=0 for all (E2 ; ) 2 [0; 1]  [M ; 1]. Therefore, for all
(E2 ; ) 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1],  fS=1   fS=0.
Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: S=2 
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Figure 2: S=1 (Single entrant case) 
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Figure 3: S=1 (Multiple entrant case) 
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Figure 4: Linear wholesale pricing (Multiple entrant case) 
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Figure 5: Linear wholesale pricing (Single entrant case) 
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Figure 6: Non-linear wholesale price (Single entrant case) 
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Figure 7: Non-linear wholesale price (Multiple entrant case) 
 
